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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) devices have been increas-
ingly integrated into our daily life. However, such smart devices
suffer a broad attack surface. Particularly, attacks targeting the
device software at runtime are challenging to defend against if
IoT devices use resource-constrained microcontrollers (MCUs).
TrustZone-M, a TrustZone extension for MCUs, is an emerging
security technique fortifying MCU based IoT devices. This paper
presents the first security analysis of potential software security
issues in TrustZone-M enabled MCUs. We explore the stack-
based buffer overflow (BOF) attack for code injection, return-
oriented programming (ROP) attack, heap-based BOF attack,
format string attack, and attacks against Non-secure Callable
(NSC) functions in the context of TrustZone-M. We validate
these attacks using the TrustZone-M enabled SAM L11 MCU.
Strategies to mitigate these software attacks are also discussed.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, microcontroller, TrustZone,
software security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) industry is booming, but
has attracted cybercriminals [1], [2]. IoT has a broad range
of application domains such as home appliances, medical
instruments, industry automation, and smart buildings. It is
reported that more than 20 billion IoT devices have been
distributed worldwide and this number will reach 41 billions
by 2027 [3]. In this paper, we focus on IoT devices using
low-cost and resource-constrained microcontrollers (MCUs),
which can communicate with the outside world through venues
such as WiFi, Bluetooth, NB-IoT and LoRa. The attack surface
of such IoT devices includes data, networking, hardware and
software [4]–[7]. We are particularly interested in runtime
software security of MCUs. Even if software/firmware in-
tegrity can be verified at boot time via mechanisms like secure
boot, protecting software of embedded devices at runtime is
challenging due to the heterogeneity and constrained compu-
tational resources of MCUs.
TrustZone-M, the TrustZone extension for ARMv8-M archi-
tecture, is an emerging solution to the runtime software secu-
rity of IoT devices [8]–[10]. Specifically, it provides resource-
constrained MCUs a lightweight hardware-based solution to
a trusted execution environment (TEE) for security related
software, i.e., Secure World (SW), isolated from the rich
execution environment (REE) for the rest of the applications,
i.e., Non-secure World (NSW). The NSW code cannot access
the SW resources directly. TrustZone-M provides a Non-secure
Callable (NSC) memory region in the SW so that functions
can be defined in the NSC region as the gateway from the
NSW to the SW. To the best of our knowledge, TrustZone-M
has not been adopted in commercial IoT products.
In this paper, we present the first security analysis of
potential software security issues in TrustZone-M enabled
IoT devices. We find that software vulnerabilities may exist in
all the regions including the NSW, NSC and SWX (which is
defined as the SW region excluding the NSC) of TrustZone-M.
TrustZone-M is subject to the code injection attack, code reuse
attack, heap-based buffer overflow attack, format string attack,
and NSC specific attacks. The first four attacks can occur in
the NSW, NSC and SWX. By exploiting NSC vulnerabilities,
attackers can breach the security of the SW from the NSW.
A number of works have been done concerning the security
issues in TrustZone. Cerdeira et al. [11] present systematiza-
tion of knowledge (SoK) on the Cortex-A TrustZone security
while our work focuses on the Cortex-M TrustZone. Iannillo
et al. [12] propose a framework for the security analysis of
TrustZone-M. However, their work does not identify concrete
vulnerabilities/attacks against TrustZone-M. Jung et al. [10]
design a secure platform based on the Platform Security Archi-
tecture (PSA) with a brief discussion of possible attacks. Our
work demonstrates five types of realistic attacks, breaching the
security of TrustZone-M.
The paper makes the following major contributions:
1) We present the first comprehensive security analysis of
the runtime software security in TrustZone-M enabled
IoT devices. From which, potential software attacks
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against TrustZone-M are presented. The SAM L11 MCU
from Microchip is often used in this paper as the instance
to demonstrate the principle while the methodologies
used can be extended to other similar products. We
validate these attacks on SAM L11 and find that even
the official code examples of SAM L11 contain security
vulnerabilities.
2) To defeat these software attacks, we discuss the use of
control flow integrity (CFI) and point out its limitations.
We present guidelines, particularly fortifying the NSC
functions, for the overall system security of TrustZone-
M enabled IoT devices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the background knowledge on ARM TrustZone-M and
runtime security in IoT devices in Section II. We next present
the five types of practical attacks against runtime software of
TrustZone-M in Section III. The evaluation of the attacks is
presented in Section IV. We discuss defense mechanisms in
Section V and the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the TrustZone-M technology
and runtime software security issues in IoT applications.
A. TrustZone-M
TrustZone for Cortex-A processors (TrustZone-A) is a se-
curity technology that isolates security-critical resources (e.g.,
memory, peripherals) from the rich OS and applications. An
ARM system on a chip (SoC) with the TrustZone extension is
split into two execution environments referred as the Secure
World (SW) and the Non-secure World (NSW). Software in
the SW has a higher privilege and can access resources in
both the SW and the NSW, while the Non-secure software is
restricted to the Non-secure resources. The NSW may commu-
nicate with the SW using the monitor mode of TrustZone-A.
Recently, the TrustZone technology has been extended to
the ARMv8-M architecture as TrustZone-M for some Cortex-
M series processors, which are specifically optimized for
resource-constrained MCUs. TrustZone-M has the SW and
NSW, but differs from TrustZone-A in terms of implementa-
tion. One prominent difference is that TrustZone-M introduces
a special Secure memory region named Non-secure Callable
(NSC) region to provide Secure services to Non-secure soft-
ware. Transition between the two worlds through the NSC is
achieved by NSC function calls and returns.
B. Runtime Software Security in IoT Devices
IoT devices connect to remote servers or controllers and re-
ceive messages from them via communication venues such as
WiFi, Bluetooth, and low-power wide-area network (LPWAN).
We find that MCU based IoT devices are often programmed
with languages such as C and C++ because they are compact,
highly efficient and have the ability of direct memory control
[13]. Such languages provide programmers a flexible platform
to interact with the low-level hardware. On the flip side,
they are notoriously error-prone and daunted with security
Non-secure SRAM
Secure SRAM
Non-secure Flash
NSC Flash
Secure Flash
0x0000 0000
0x0001 0000
0x2000 0000
0x2000 4000
Fig. 1. Memory layout of SAM L11. The memory is divided into the SW
and NSW at the hardware level, where code in the SW (Secure Flash, NSC
Flash, and Secure SRAM) can access the whole chip, while code in the NSW
(Non-secure Flash and Non-secure SRAM) can only directly access resources
inside the NSW.
issues. Attackers may perform runtime software attacks against
vulnerable IoT devices with such features.
Runtime software attacks may hijack the program control
flow by altering the control data (e.g., return address, function
pointer) or change program memory by manipulating non-
control data [4]. Often in such an attack, an adversary corrupts
the vulnerable memory by inputting a carefully crafted mali-
cious payload, which eventually results in abnormal program
behaviors.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST RUNTIME SOFTWARE IN
TRUSTZONE-M
In this section, we first present the threat model on how a
TrustZone-M enabled IoT device may be attacked. We then
present five runtime software attacks against TrustZone-M
enabled IoT devices. We often use the SAM L11 MCU as the
example while the principle is the same for all TrustZone-M
enabled devices.
A. Threat Model
We consider a victim IoT device using the TrustZone-
M enabled MCU. It is assumed that security related coding
mistakes exist in the software of the victim device, which
is able to receive inputs from the Internet or peripherals.
Though the SW of TrustZone-M provides a TEE that the
NSW software cannot directly access, the TEE can only work
normally under the assumption that Secure software is well
crafted with no security related coding mistakes. However,
coding mistakes may exist in TrustZone-M’s NSW, the NSC
region, and the SWX region. Memory layout of a TrustZone-M
based MCU, SAM L11, is shown in Figure 1. An adversary
can exploit the coding mistakes and send a malicious input
(i.e. payload) to deploy software attacks. Even if the SW does
not accept inputs from the Internet or peripherals and only
the NSW communicates with the outside world, an attacker
may compromise the NSW and feed malicious inputs into
vulnerable NSC functions, which can access Secure resources.
Therefore, if a NSC function is vulnerable, the entire SW may
be compromised.
B. Runtime Software Attacks
Table I lists software attacks we have identified against the
NSW, NSC and SWX of TrustZone-M. It can be observed that
TABLE I
SOFTWARE ATTACKS IN TRUSTZONE-M
Software Attacks NSW NSC SWX
Code injection 3 3 3
ROP 3 3 3
Heap-based BOF 3 3 3
Format string attack 3 3 3
NSC-specific exploit N/A 3 N/A
traditional software attacks found in other platforms such as
computers and smart phones can be conducted in all regions
of TrustZone-M, including code injection, return-oriented pro-
gramming (ROP), heap-based buffer overflow (BOF), and
format string attacks. We also discover potential exploits
specifically targeting the NSC. Here, all attacks against the
NSC refer to those deployed against the SW from the NSW.
We present the details of these attacks in the context of
TrustZone-M below.
1) Stack-based Buffer Overflow Attack for Code Injection:
The stack-based buffer overflow (BOF) is a canonical memory
corruption attack that occurs on the stack when a larger input
is written to a local buffer without checking the buffer’s
boundary. Listing 1 presents an example, in which buf[256]
will overflow if the input is longer than 256 bytes. As a
result, the extra data will overwrite the adjoining stack contents
including the return address, at which the control flow will
continue after the subroutine returns. Adversaries may perform
the stack-based BOF attack for malicious code injection. The
control flow can be redirected to the malicious code sent
along with the payload by overflowing the local buffer and
overwriting the original return address with the entry address
of the malicious code.
1 void BOF_func(char *input){
2 char buf[256];
3 strcpy(buf, input);}
Listing 1. Example of a function with BOF vulnerability
To specifically implement a stack-based BOF attack against
the ARMv8-M architecture, we first investigate its stack struc-
ture. A stack frame for a function in ARMv8-M consists of
local variables, variable registers (R4–R7), and return address,
as illustrated in Figure 2. By exploiting functions with BOF
vulnerabilities, an adversary is able to copy a crafted payload
to the buffer, overwrite the return address, and inject malicious
code onto the stack. While constructing the malicious payload,
the entry of the malicious code on the stack is needed but
unknown to the adversary. A common solution is to utilize the
“JMP SP” instruction found in the device’s software [14]. Even
if there is no such instruction in the software, an adversary
may enumerate possible entry addresses of malicious code
to find the correct one. A wrong address in the payload
lead to a program crush and restart (if automatic restart is
enabled), and the malicious code would not be executed until
the correct entry address is hit. This entry scanning process
can be more efficient by inserting a sequence of NOP (no-
operation) instructions, called a NOP sled, before the injected
code in the payload since any hit of a NOP instruction will
lead to the execution of malicious code eventually.
(NOPs)
Malicious code
Entry of mal. code*
Variable registers
Return address
buf[256]
(Garbage bytes)
Entry of mal. code
(NOPs)
Malicious code
(mal. code)
Stack TopPayload1 in case1 Payload2 in case2copy copy
Stack 
frame
(Low address)
(High address)
Fig. 2. Stack-based buffer overflow attack for code injection
A challenge of implementing BOF, also exists in ARMv8-
M, comes from the null bytes (0x00) in the payload, which
also functions as the C string terminator. If the exploitable
function treats the payload as a string (e.g., strcpy(), strcat())
and some null bytes exist in the crafted payload, the function
will cease to copy the payload after hitting a null byte and the
attack will fail. We discuss two cases of null bytes as follows.
First, null bytes can exist in the malicious code and the NOP
sled since null bytes are naturally contained in many ARM
instructions. To eliminate these null bytes, one can replace the
problematic instructions by alternative instructions with the
same functionalities but without null bytes. For an instance, a
NOP instruction (0xBF00) can be replaced by the instruction
MOV R2, R2 (0x121C).
The second case is the null bytes in the entry address of
the malicious code. In SAM L11, this has to be in an area
of the SRAM with a fixed address range from 0x20000000 to
0x20004000, with the upper halfword always being 0x2000,
containing a null byte. A potential solution is to construct
the payload like Payload 2 in Figure 2, in which the entry
address is placed at the bottom. Further because the little-
endian ordering in ARMv8-M, the 0x2000 is consistently
located at the last two bytes of Payload 2 and shall be the
only two bytes missing when copied to the stack. But, the
original return address will already contain 0x2000 in its upper
halfword if the caller function is executed from the SRAM, in
which case the BOF will still be applicable.
2) Return-oriented Programming: BOF based code in-
jection can be mitigated by security mechanisms like non-
executable memory region [15], which prevents code execution
from certain memory region. However, an attacker can bypass
such defense by leveraging code reuse attack (CRA). A
representative CRA is return-oriented programming (ROP).
Utilizing BOF to overwrite the return address, ROP redirects
the control flow to a code sequence (called a gadget) found in
the existing software code. It is also possible to chain several
gadgets for more complex program control. Each gadget in
the chain is a code segment responsible for certain operations
(e.g., arithmetic operations and load/store data) and must end
with the epilogue of a subroutine to help chain the gadgets.
In ARMv8-M, the instruction sequence {POP LR, BX LR},
which is the epilogue of leaf subroutines, pops a word to
link register (LR), and then branch to the address specified
by LR. Instruction POP PC, which is the epilogue of non-leaf
copy
…
POP {R4, R5, LR}
BX LR
Variable registers
Return address
buf[256]
Stack Top
(Low address)
(High address)
…
POP {R4, PC} 
…
POP LR
BX LR
(Garbage bytes)
Entry of Gadget 1
(Popped to R4)
(Popped to R5)
Entry of Gadget2
(Popped to R4)
Entry of Gadget3
Payload
Gadget1
Gadget2
Gadget3
Gadget 
frame for 
Gadget1 
Gadget 
frame for 
Gadget2 
Fig. 3. Return-oriented programming
subroutines, directly pops a word to program counter (PC).
Now we explain how to chain the gadgets utilizing the sub-
routine epilogue in each of them. An adversary needs to craft
a “gadget stack” and sends it along with the payload. Each
gadget in the chain, except the last one, has a corresponding
gadget frame placed on the gadget stack. A gadget frame
consists of several words of data that will be popped to the
operand registers of the last POP instruction in that gadget.
The data provided by the gadget frame includes the address
of the next gadget, which helps to jump to the next gadget
after being popped. An example of a chain of three gadgets
in ARMv8-M is presented in Figure 3. The payload contains
the entry of Gadget 1 and two gadget frames corresponding
to Gadget 1 and 2. To ensure the entry of Gadget 2 will be
popped to LR, the gadget frame for Gadget 1 contains three
words since the second to last instruction in Gadget 1 pops
three words from the stack. Two words before the entry of
Gadget 2 are provided such that they will be popped to R4 and
R5 instead. Similarly, the gadget frame for Gadget 2 provides
two words of data which will be popped to R4 and PC so that
execution of Gadget 3 can be routed to start.
3) Heap-based BOF Attacks: A heap-based BOF refers to
a form of BOF exploitation in the heap area. As a SAM L11
project is linked with the GNU libc, the heap in SAM L11
is managed by the glibc allocator [16]. The glibc allocator
manages free chunks in a doubly-linked list where each chunk
contains the metadata of a forward pointer and a backward
pointer pointing to the free chunk before and after it. A simple
exploitation of heap-based BOF is to overwrite the function
pointers stored on the heap to hijack the program control
flow. An adversary may also overwrite the metadata of a free
chunk via overflowing an adjacent activated data chunk. By
manipulating the pointers in the metadata, an adversary is able
to corrupt arbitrary memory with arbitrary values [17].
4) Format String Attacks: The format string exploits occur
when a format function (e.g., printf()) receives a format string
input (the first argument of a format function), which contains
more format specifiers (like %s, %d) than the arguments
supplied. An adversary can send a well-crafted payload to
a vulnerable format string function with number of specific
format specifiers more than required arguments. This may
eventually cause memory leakage or alteration in the stack,
or even in an arbitrary readable/writable memory location.
In SAM L11, an adversary is able to exploit format string
vulnerabilities for reading values from the stack by sending
a malicious text input containing more format specifiers. For
example, by sending string “%x %x %x” to the vulnerable
function illustrated in Listing 2, in which no arguments is pro-
vided to specifiers in the format string, three bytes of data will
be printed in hexadecimal from the stack. However, reading
or writing at an arbitrary memory location is unachievable in
SAM L11 due to its particular memory addressing as shown
in Figure 1. Such attacks require the target address be present
in the payload. Adversaries who aim at the memory of SAM
L11 will find that any address of the memory would contain at
least one null byte. The format string function will terminate
the process of parsing the payload when it hits the null byte.
1 void fmt_str(char *input){
2 printf(input);
3 ...
Listing 2. Example of a vulnerable format string function
5) Attacks against Non-secure Callable (NSC) Functions:
The Non-secure software in the NSW may desire to use the
Secure services in the SW. For the sake of such requirement,
TrustZone-M provides the NSC memory region within the
SW. Developers are able to define NSC functions in the NSC
as the gateway to the SW. NSC functions are characterized
with two features: (i) They can be called from the NSW; (ii)
They have the privilege of accessing Secure resources since
the NSC is a region within the SW. With such abilities, Non-
secure software can call specific Secure services by first calling
the corresponding NSC functions. The NSC functions then
help to call the target Secure functions and pass the required
arguments assigned by the Non-secure callers.
As the gateway to the SW, the implementation of the NSC
software should be particularly cautious. According to the
guidance from ARM [18], it is the common responsibility
of hardware, toolchain, and software developers to implement
the NSC software securely. Though some requirements are
offered in the guidelines, since the hardware and toolchain
vary from vendors to vendors, there is no off-the-shelf solution
to implementing trusted NSC software.
We identify two pitfalls that software developers may meet
while programming the NSC functions. The first pitfall is
caused by the data arguments sent from the NSW. The
toolchain of SAM L11 only helps to generate the Secure
gateway veneer for NSC functions but leaves the function
programming to the developers. Security related coding mis-
takes may present in the NSC functions as well and can be
exploited by crafting Non-secure data inputs injected from
NSW. Software exploits in the NSC region lead to a com-
promised SW. The second pitfall comes from the untrusted
address input. When Non-secure software passes an pointer
argument to the SW through NSC functions, the SW should
ensure that the pointer is within the NSW. Otherwise, Secure
functions may assist the NSW to read or write the Secure
memory. The vulnerable NSC function illustrated in Listing 3
can leak and corrupt the Secure memory content at arbitrary
Secure addresses if the first and the third arguments are Secure
addresses and the second argument is set to 1. The violation
of the principle that “Secure resources are not allowed to
be accessed by the NSW” severely harms the fundamental
security of the TrustZone-M implementation.
1 int NSC_func(int *a, int b, int *c){
2 int *addr = a; int num = b; int *sum = c;
3 for (int i = 0; i < num; i++){
4 &sum += addr[i];}
5 return &sum;}
Listing 3. Example of a vulnerable NSC function
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the five software attacks de-
scribed in Section III. We are able to successfully perform
these attacks against a TrustZone-M enabled MCU, SAM L11.
A. Experiment Setup
We use a laptop as the attacker to continually send text
inputs to a SAM L11 Xplained Pro Evaluation Kit as the
victim device. The laptop is connected with SAM L11 through
a USB-to-UART adapter while an attacker may also inject
malicious strings into an Internet connection of a SAM L11
based IoT device. In SAM L11, two UARTs are configured
accordingly as a Non-secure peripheral and a Secure peripheral
to receive inputs sent from the laptop to the NSW and SW
respectively. For the first four attacks, we construct specific
vulnerable functions in both Non-secure and Secure applica-
tions of SAM L11 and malicious payloads will be sent through
the UARTs to trigger the attacks. The sizes of the payloads
and experiment results are given in Table II.
B. Experiment Results
In the BOF-based code injection attack, we configure the
stack to be executable, which is commonly configurable in
TrustZone-M enabled MCUs. We assemble the payload with
components including a constant string, a malicious code,
the entry of the malicious code (obtained via random brute-
force scanning), and a NOP sled of 50 NOP instructions. The
malicious code is designed to call a Non-secure print function
and provide the address of the constant string as the argument
to the print function. Our attack successes and the constant
string is printed in the adversary’s terminal.
As the proof-of-concept implementation of ROP, we craft
three exploitable gadgets by splitting the assembly code of a
program which prints content at a given memory location, into
three code segments and appending a subroutine epilogue (i.e.,
POP PC) at the end of each segment. These gadgets are pre-
stored at different locations of the flash in advance. We craft a
gadget stack to chain these gadgets and send it along with the
payload to SAM L11. As a result, the intended constant string
is successfully printed in the adversary’s terminal. A way
to evaluate the feasibility of ROP against a certain program
is to count up the occurrence of potential gadgets in the
program. In fact, this process is equivalent to counting up
the number of “POP PC” and “BX LR” instructions according
to the definition of potential gadgets in Section III. We take a
basic NSW application image, which only initializes necessary
peripherals, as an example and search all the subroutine
epilogues in it. The Capstone disassembly engine [19] is used
to dissemble and search in the binary code. The size of the
example image is 4.14KB with 1908 instructions in total. As a
result, 49 “POP PC” and 16 “BX LR” are found in the image
binary, representing 3.41% of the whole image.
To launch the heap-based BOF attack, we first construct two
adjacent data blocks on the heap of SAM L11 and a vulnerable
strcpy() function, which copies the input payload to a buffer in
the first data block without checking its boundary. Our payload
successfully triggers the BOF attack and overwrites a function
pointer in next data block with the entry of a pre-injected
malicious code. The malicious code is later executed when
that function is called.
As we stated in Section III-B4, an adversary can exploit the
vulnerable format string function in SAM L11 to read out the
stack content. The payload used is “%08x %08x %08x %08x
%08x” and we eventually read five sequential bytes from the
stack via UARTs.
To verify the feasibility of NSC-specific attacks, we look
into the example software projects provided by the vendor of
SAM L11, five of which contain NSC software implemen-
tations. We statically analyze the source code of these five
NSC implementations and find three to be vulnerable. These
three implementations share two vulnerable NSC functions as
in Listing 4, where two of them contain the first function and
the other contains the second function. The first vulnerable
function is subject to the format string attack when it is called
by the Non-secure software and the argument is a crafted
format string input that can be controlled by an adversary.
In our experiment, we send “%08x %08x %08x %08x %08x”
as the payload and five sequential bytes from the Secure stack
are eventually printed on the adversary’s terminal. The second
function has an information leakage problem. We call this
function in the NSW and the argument passed to this function
is a Secure address. The Secure memory content at the target
location is then printed.
1 void __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry))
nsc_secure_console_puts (char *string){
2 non_secure_puts(string);}
3
4 void __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) nsc_puts(
uint8_t * string){
5 printf("%s", string);}
Listing 4. Vulnerable NSC functions in SAM L11 demo code
V. DISCUSSION: DEFENSE TO RUNTIME SOFTWARE
ATTACKS AGAINST TRUSTZONE-M
The control flow integrity (CFI) may prevent runtime
control-oriented attacks. By monitoring the control flow of
a program at runtime, it can detect unexpected control flow
changes. In [7], CFI is implemented for TrustZone-M to
protect the NSW. The control flow graph (CFG) of a program
is constructed by static or dynamic analysis of its code
and is saved in a non-writable region of the NSW. Code
instrumentation is performed so that the program jumps to a
branch monitor before any control flow change in the original
TABLE II
SIZES OF PAYLOADS AND EXPERIMENT RESULTS IN DIFFERENT ATTACK SCENARIOS.
Attack Scenarios Sizes of Payloads (byte) Experiment Results
Code injection 256 90.62s is spent on scanning the entry of the malicious code, which is then successfully executed.
ROP 96 Crafted string is printed; 65 potential gadgets are found in a 4.14KB image.
Heap-based BOF 24 The malicious code is successfully executed.
Format string exploits 24 Five sequential bytes are read from the Non-secure and Secure stacks.
NSC-specific attacks 24 & 4 3 of 5 demo projects contain vulnerable NSC functions; Five sequential bytes are read fromthe Secure stack; Secure memory content is printed.
code. The branch monitor refers to the CFG and monitors
control flow changes at runtime. Before a function call, the
correct return address is pushed on a shadow stack in the SW.
Recall a function may be called by multiple functions, and
return to different places at runtime. Since the CFG cannot
tell the exact return address at runtime, the shadow stack in
the SW is used to record the correct return address.
The CFI for protecting the control flow of the NSW is not
sufficient for the overall system security. It can be observed
from Table I that all software attacks may occur in all the
three regions, i.e. the NSW, NSC and SWX, of TrustZone-M.
Another issue of CFI is that it may not defeat the heap-based
BOF or format string attacks if the control flow is not changed,
but sensitive data is stolen or changed.
For the overall security of TrustZone-M based IoT systems,
the following strategies may be adopted. First, the SW shall
not have the Internet connection in order to avoid remote
exploits of SW software vulnerabilities. Second, the arguments
sent from the NSW to an NSC function may be an address
or application data. If it is an address, the NSC function
must verify that it is not a Secure address before passing the
address argument to the SW, since an NSW program shall
not access the SW resources directly. If it is application data,
input sanitization shall be carefully performed. Third, security
mechanisms including CFI and onboard executable space
protection of TrustZone-M shall be applied to the NSW for
control flow integrity. Finally, secure coding, code review and
penetration testing are critical to the overall system security
and the best practice shall be adopted [20]. Runtime software
attacks may also be mitigated by programming the MCUs with
security oriented languages such as Java [21], [22] and Rust
[23].
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper gives the first systematic runtime software secu-
rity analysis for TrustZone-M enabled IoT devices. We present
possible pitfalls of TrustZone-M programming and present
five potential software attacks against TrustZone-M, including
the stack-based BOF attack for code injection, return-oriented
programming, heap-based BOF attacks, format string attacks
and attacks against NSC functions. We validate these attacks
on a TrustZone-M enabled MCU, SAM L11. To defeat these
attacks, we present guidelines for an overall system security
of TrustZone-M enabled IoT devices.
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